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This paper will examine three instances of African protest: the
attempts to resist the removals in the Johannesburg western areas,
the opposition to Bantu Education and the Alexandra bus boycott of
1957* It was hoped that analyses of these movements would throw
some light on the relationship of organised nationalist opposition
to the less formal resistance that sprung from economic pressures
rather than clearly percieved political aspirations- To have
examined^ in detail protes-t in which the ANC was" not obviously involved,
might have provided: a more useful focus but unfortunately information
on the kind of 'informal1 protest described below is difficult to
obtain from the more obvious sources which for rearsons of time the
research for this paper had to be limited. However an examination
of the three campaigns does provide some insight into the relationship
between the ANC and local interests and the extent to which it succeedec
in channelling and expressing popular grievances. This may help to
correct distortions which have resulted from a tendancy to analyse
African political opposition purely from the perspective of the
nationalist movement, considering it in isolation from the general
socio-economic context of black politics. The history of the ANC in
the 1950s heeds to be written from a local level: how did branches
(• • operate, how were they viewed in the local community, what particular
interests did they represent, was there anything socially distinct
about their membership, howwere the local communities structured?
Some of the hesitation to look critically at the social basis of black
politics has been the result of much of the writing about the oppositior
of this period being the work of people who were closely involved
in the Congress, movement. Congress ideology at the time stressed the
virtually undifferentiated nature of the African population. In 1955,
the editor of a pro-Congress newspaper, New Age, wrote:
South Africa is singular in the respect that, unlike India,
Indonesia or China, she has no native bourgeoisie of any
significance... Our movement does not consist of a bloc of
three classes. The proletariat constitutes" the preponderant
majority in our national struggle.•• The oppressed have no
tradition of private ownership under capitalism... the
proletariat will emerge at the head of the national movement
and proceed to solve the contradictions of capitalism by
C. proletarian methods of class struggle.(I)
Similarly: """
When the middle class grows; very slowly or even declines, the
number of urban workers grows: very rapidly because of a rise of
industry. We may therefore expect to find that the national
movement acquires a definite working class character.(2)
A willingness to work on unproven assumptions has also influenced less-
•^  partisan ^ writing. Edward.Jj'eit in his study__of__the ANC daring the mid~_
1950s ; rela te"s"what he sees as the poor response to ANC calls_for militar
.'cy to the post-war growth in the South African economy. He maintains
mat the economy kept ahead of the 'revolution of rising expectations1,
that, at best black opposition was: sporadic and limited by reluctence to
risk losing the chances of economic gain.(3)
The/sets of generalisation are inadequate. As will be shown, both in
the Western Areas removals and the Alexandra bus boycott the social
setting was complex and different interest groups played different roles
during these arents. Secondly, if one looks beyond those protest movement
that the Congress ideologues and their academic critics regard as
politically significant(4) a more continuous and widespread resistance
can be detected, one which casts some doubt on Feit's assertion that
- 'order i.; the normal state of things and disorder is very difficult to
sustain1" (5). A few examples of this 'informal1 resistance serve to
illustrate the point. In 1954 the Johannesburg city council announced
that rents were to go up in the south-western townships of Moroka,
Orlando and Jabavu. A rent boycott forced the council to drop the
proposal. ANC members were involved but the principal spokesmen for
the tenants were not congressites: for the next few years they were to
dominate Orlando advisory board politics as the Asinamali party having
been elected on the strength of their leadership during the boycott. A
similar boycott took place in Jabavu in 1956 (6). The Alexandra bus
boycott was the most publicised of the 1950s bus boycotts (partly
because Africans had to walk a long distance through white residential
areas and therefore excited much concern and some sympathy). But it
was not the only bus boycott of the decade nor evan the longest. The
tenrv.c^ K-. Evaton boycott of 1955-56, the Brakpan boycott of 1956, the
Sophiatown boycott of 1955 and one at Katlegong near Natalspruit, were
with the exception of the last(7), similar reactions to attempts to
raise fares. A rather different sort of protest was the womens riots in
Vlakfontein in December 1956. Vlakfontein was a model township and the
{:. Pretoria city council felt that the e istence of fowl runs threatened
healph standards and so the police were sent in to destroy them. The
women reacted by rioting and attacking the police(8). Two other riots
of the same period show.how a relatively minor material complaint could
provide the initial spark for a violent confrontation. In April 1956
Germiston hostel dwellers burnt down the building and in the subsequent
conflict with the police four men were killed. The initial anger was
caused by what was felt to be a deterioration in the food (9). A
comparable outburst occurred a year later in central Johannesburg when
customers at a beer-hall rioted as a response to a change in the
quality of the brew (10).
It is significant that most of these incidents arose from economic
griev.nces. They do not suggest that economic growth was providing a
standard of living that kept ahead of any revolution of rising expectati<
A survey of African poverty conducted by the Institute of Race Relations
found Q7% of African families in Johannesburg earned below what was
considered neccessary for the minimum essential expenditure(II). It is
in this general context of widespread urban poverty and tension that
.'•. political protest should be considered.
The plan to remove the African inhabitants of the Western townships
to a new location in Meadowlands (next to Orlando) was-first announced
by the secretary for native affairs at the Advisory Boards Congress- in
January 1954- The Congress1discussed the proposal and it was only
because of the presence of ANC members among the delegates that it was;
decided to oppose the removals (12). The first removals were scheduled
for February 12 1955. In the week beforehand sixty Sophiatown families^
were told to move, being offerect the choice of houses: in Meadowlands
or a site in Diepkloof. The families?: were all former tenants of an Indi
landlord who had sold his property to the government (13). Opposition
to the move was discussed by three seperate organisations: the standhold
Anti-Expropriation and Proper Housing Committee led by Dr A B Xuma, a
former president of the ANC, the Ratepayers Association and the regional
organisation as well as the local branch of the ANC. The standholders
were secretive about their plans forresisting the move: at. the Anti-
Expropriation Committee's public meeting of January 22nd people who
wanted to discuss the committee's ideas were assured that plans had beaer
made but for reasons of security they could not be disclosed(I4).
Congress leaders were more explicit: at an open air meeting in
Sophiatown on January 9th the crowd was told by'volunteer-in-chief
Robert Resha, a Sophiatown resident and a member of the ANC national
executivet that on the day of the removals:
You will say that you will not move, and by saying that you
mean you will sit down, you will not move1 (15;
It wars a strategy that wa-s: endorsed by P Q Vundla, Western Areas ANC
chairman, who promised that those who were-brought to court would have
their legal defence paid for by Congress (16) ANC leaders would be on
the spot on the I2th to lead the resist nee (17)
The ANC's appeal seems to have been intended to mobilise young people
in Sophiatown. Robert Resha was~ rather a different figure from the
local established ANC leadership. During the war he had worked in the
mines: and after being dismissed for political agitation wrote articles
for newspapers. He waff a leading figure in the Transvaal Youth League
and was: imprisoned during the 1952 -53 defiance campaign. Resha had
built up a group of young 'Freedom Volunteers1 of which he claimed there
were 500 in Sophiatown. The volunteers were to mobilise, lead and
discipline the resistance; they were on no account 'to allow themselves
to be provoked into violent action1 (18). In Resha's speeches there was
a strong theme of moral rehabilitation* youth was-
...to stop playing dice, abusing women and going to the bioscope
for the next twelve days. The police know they are helpless to stop
crime here in Sophiatown ...You must show that the removal is
uppermost in your minds ...boycott pleasure.• (19)
He went on to call for daily training meetings for the young men and
prayer meetings for the women.
The Freedom volunteers appeared on the streets for the first time on the
evening of February 7th. The World sourly reported that 'many of the
volunteers were the sons and relatives of property owners1. During the
week that followed there was-apparently a considerable struggle between
Congress organisers and the young men who came into Sophiatown from other
parts of the reef demanding violent action against the removals (20). Not
all the violently disposed people were from outside: Drum reported that
a*section of Sophiatown's ANC Youth League were?flirting with the
•Berliners', the leading Sophiatown gangster group. The Berliners were
said to be trying to intimidate Congress intw using violence (21).
But when the first removals actually took place their was~ neither violent
nor peaceful opposition: two thousand police were drafted into Sophiatown
to ensure that these did not take place. In fact Congress strategy, in an.
case, seems to have been to avoid confrontation: on the night before the
first removals (which were brought forward three days) Congress volunteer
went from house to house helping families who did not wish to be sent to
Meadowl^ds to move their belongings into shelters which had been
previously constructed by the volunteers behind other properties. Twenty-
two families were helped in this fashion. The tactic was;repeated on the
night before the I9th February, the day of the second lot of removals.
This time, only one family wasmoved before forty volunteers were arrested
and the attempt to forstall the authorities was abaponed. By this stage
the futility of these efforts was.becoming more obvious: of the
families movedin the previous week by the ANC, fourteen had applied to
the authorities for housing at Meadowlands. A change in strategy was
needed• Resha announced obliquely:
We have our plans but we are not going to carry them out until a
a later stage when we think the time is opportune (22)»
However thiaiwas the end of any attempts to organise mass resistance to
the Emovals. The World of March 26th noted the first removals on the
east side of Sophiatown. They were very quiet and unaffected residents
seemed quite accustomed to the removals and took little notice. By July
the minutes of a Sophiatown ANC Youth League contained the admission
that 'we have accepted the removals as routine1 although they also stated
that young people were 'dead scared1 and"were craving to have guns1 (23).
At this point the focus of the resistance shifted from the tenants to the
property owners. The Sophiatown Ratepayers Association and the
standholders committee held a meeting to discuss a united front, the
object being to persuade all African and Indian standholders to refuse
to sell their properties to the Native Resettlement Board. By the
end of March 651 African standholders in Sophiatown and Martindale had
signed such an undertaking. From now on the struggle was to be confined
to legalistic manoevres and its objectives became increasingly limited: b>
1956 standholders were no longer challenging the principle of their
right to tenure but instead were trying to negotiate the fixed official
values ser, m their property. Government strategy seems to have
followed tht line of least resist nee: first the tenants of non-African
landlords were moved, then African traders who occupied stands owned by
Indians and Chinese (almost all Sophiatown trading stands were Indian or
Chinese owned) (24), then in 1956 the tenants of African standholders (abc
20# of Sophiatown stands were owned by Africans) and finally in late 1957
the by then isolated African property owners. (25)
Attempts to mobilise enthusiatic resistance to the Western Areas removal
scheme failed. Congress organisers and their critics saw tha failure in
terms of a confusion of aims. As J B Marks pointed out there were
considerable flaws-in the direction of the movement:
...a major weakness was a confusion as to the aims of the
campaign. The slogan 'we will not move1 laid itself open to
a literal interpretation that people will physically resist
removal. Yet again and again Congress leaders called for restraint
and non-violence. It is clear that the slogan implied really
'You will not move voluntarily1 ...The people were given the
impression that some last minute instructions would be
issued. Those on whom resistance depended were in doubt as
to what exactly they were opected to do (26)
But was^there enough unity among Sophiatown Inhabitants for mass resistan<
AKC organisers were aware of some of the problems. J J Matlou, the
branch organiser, wars to appeal to tenants not to estrange themselves
from landlords who were abusing their position by demanding key money
and shutting off water to those who were behind with their rents.
Congress would deal with such people when the struggle was over (27).
But some of the freedomd Congress professed to be defending were ones
which would have had little meaning to their audience. Fifty-eight
thousand people were to be moved from the Western Areas. In Sophiatown
there lived only 300 property owners (28). Incomes in the Western Areas
were extremely low: it was: estimated in 1953 that 21$ of the
population earned under £10 a month, 55JS between £10 and £20 and 20% abovt
£20 (29). So when ANC speakers told their audiences 'we are defending
the principle, the right to own your own site and build your own home1 (3C
they were speaking to people who lived crowded into shacks built on tiny
plots rented out by standholders. The World (admittedly a newspaper oftei
hostile to the ANC) reported Sophiatown sub-tenants as being in favour of
removals because of the higher standard of housing being offered at
Meadowlands (31).
The ANC's decision to oppose the removals was, not merely the result of a
l h " u l o f a mi sca lcu la t ion but r e f l e c t e d the i n t e r e s t s of l o c a l
Congress l e a d e r s . P Q Vundla, the ANC's Western Area chairman who led
the oppos i t ion i s a good example. Vundla was a prominent l o c a l buslnessmar
and took an a c t i v e p a r t in the formation of b o t h p r o p e r t y owners • S m a l
S ? ? %!£' S1?? p l a y e d a n ^Portant r l i l l d i b
 •
!£' T n ?  o le n ocal a visory oard
po l i t i c s (32). J D Matlou, one of the main Sophiatown organisers was an
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worth£7°?74 Ch»P™an°J!?'thr£nf\?rOperty. ac«>rding to his own valuation,
™ . Q, 174. Chairman of the Sophiatown ANC at the time of the removals
was Simon Tyeku, a coal merchant and uroDertv owner fvn nnY.<«.r <-v,Q «,.,,.i,,ITtL™* fNC-s leadership in the WesLrHrLs^s dominatefby^emberf *
of the small but comparatively prosperous e l i t e .
I t was not a leadership that went uncontested. During the removals
campaign, and the Bantu Education boycott that followed i t , there was
o f thaSYn^h°SH,^ b v ^ ? n t h e « t a b l i ? h e d branch l e a d e r s h i p members
*L%E4-™°™ ^ v g I: y u n d l a YaswPhysically attacked by members of theSophiatown ANC Youth League in May 1955 (36). And It is significant that
what res is tance there was; to the removals came from the Youth league 2 3
'.he young men who made up the 'Freedom Volunteer' group.For as weflas the
property owning group there was.another in t e res t inflSInc?ng ANC
hP i e 2 * T n e g r i d ' s observation tha t many of the volunteers seemed to
be sons of property owners perhaps should not be taken too ser iously . For
men and women who did not l ive with t h e i r families the removals
represented a serious th rea t . For a l l tenants were subject to a screening
process before being sent to Meadowlands to ensure that only family un i t s
were housed the re . Single people were e i t he r sent to hostels or endorsed
out of Johannesburg altogether (37). This might explain the desperation
= =
 y
,?f?g p e ? E l e a~ described by the Youth League minutes mentioned above
tnJlSl a f ?he e f fo r t s of 'the Ber l ine r s ' to influence Congress policy
towards violent confrontation. I t was a fear that did provide a
d i S f , ? r n a b l e * ! : h e m e *" s ? e e ? h e s by *outh League spokesmen who were less prone
to viewing the issue simply as -freedom for freehold ' . Not everybody could
go to Meadowland, they insis ted, there were homes only for the servants
of white people. For the others, the young unemployed and i l l ega l ly
res ident , labour camps were being constructed. One speaker made a point
of using the version of Afrikaans used by ' t s o t s i ' groups (33). In contras
,£„„« a ? p e a l ! ? a d e ^y property owners, the underlying assumption of the
irguement was that the at t ract ive prospect of being r e se t t l ed at
Meadowlands was an i l l u s ion , not that i t represented a dimunition of
r igh t s . The western areas removes posed for the older loca l ANC leadershi
f,hd i e r ^ S t h e y r ePresented a direct t h rea t to the i r economic in t e r e s t s
^ ? n < W e r e °PP° s e d *° thofe ? f t h e community as. a whole; the only way to
mobilise any support for their posi t ion was to rely on a group who
represented a challenge to their legi t imacy.
l^t ™?paig?uagl!ln;it ? a n ^ Eduoation recievedr.lts greatest degree of
support in the Rand: by the end of April 1955 after three weeks of boycott
SfnSS? Soverment controlled schools, 6948 children and 116 teachers were
banned by the authorities from attending government schools as a result
of their participation in the boycott. 2000 of these children and seventy
J? »?ers were from the Johannesburg Western Areas (39). 21 teachers were
ri™Jf? ^ Alexandra (40). Benoni, Roodeport, Moroka-Jabavu, Sophiatown,
Germiston, Brakpan, Alexandra and Natalspruit were affected. The boycott
b
»!rioT.chdepen^unt^y °£ ?ny d i r e c t i v e ^om the African National Congress
nfn™? £P" ^ 6 f i rf t J l o M"on t0 boycott the government schools was in
Benoni where it started on Ilth April. Benoni was one of the poorest of
the Rand townships (41). A local ANC leader, Walter Ngquoyi, was also
president of Iso Lomzi, a party that seems to have developed out an earlii
squatters movement- At a meeting held in February people were reported
to be contributing generously to a fund that was to provide alternative
facilities and teachers were said to be under pressure from the
community to participate in the boycott (42). In Benoni the campaign
seems to have Aveloped out of popular antipathy to the government
measures; it was not a boycott imposed on an apathetic population by a
minority group. Germiston and Alexandra ANC branches began organising
their boycotts one day after Benoni!s began.
Tfce decision to boycott was initiated at branch level. .When Brakpan
proposed a boycott a member of the Transvaal Executive was sent to tell
them to wait until the province had Bcieved a clear directive from the
National Executive. For though a decision to boycott schools had been
taken at the 1954 national conference of the ANC and had been widely
publicised to begin on April 1st, in March the National Executive
ordered a postponement. This reflected considerable doubt among ANC
leaders as to the wisdom of a boycott at all (43). There was also
ambivelence over the boycott at a provincial level of the organisation:
P Q Vundla of the Western Areas Regional Committee beleived that the
boycott should be limited to a token demonstration; it should only be
implemented to April 25th, the deadline set by the Education
Department for school registration (44), Many delegates from the Transva-
province to the December 1955 national conference were found to be
members of the new school boards (45).
In May the ANC national executive reconsidered its decison and a three
phase campaign was announced starting with an intensive propaganda
campaign, then the withdrawal of children in all areas where alternative
facilities were organised and finally total withdrawal and 'non-
cooperation with all activities directly or indirectly connected with
the Bantu Education Act'(4 )• However though there was an ineffective
attempt to organise a boycott in the Eastern Cape in fact the campaign di
not spread from the original areas where branches had acted on their
own initiative. What helped to give the campaign in those areas extra
Impetus was the organisation of 'cultural clubs1: by November 1955
these were operating in Brakpan, Benoni, Germiston, Natalspruit,
Alexandra and Moroka. But the dubs were forbidden to provide any
formal education and there were complaints-from some branches that they
had not recieved the promised instruction sheets from the 'National
Education Movement •, the umbrella organisation established by Congress^
Despite these shortcomings the clubs survived for well over a year: in
October 1956 it was claimed that I 515 children were still attending
them (48).
But alongside the ANC attempts to provide an alternative for the banned
schoolchildren there was emerging a parents movement in reaction to the
boycott. In Brakpan, Alexandra and Western Areas parents committees^opene
up community schools for expelled children. The schools were financed ar.
run by the parents themselves but. they all aDplied for recognition to the
to the Bantu Education Department. By Augusx"iP55 the Matlhomola
private community school in the Western Areas had 950 pupils (almost hall
the children affected by bans). ANC officials had sounded out the
school's secretary on the possibility of their serving on the school
committee. They had been told that before they could stand for
election 'they must confess to their followers that they have changed
and that they support the present system1 (49). In Brakpan where a schoc
had been opened in September 1955 by the Brakpan Civic Protection Society
(a parents1 group) there was stiff opposition from the ANC. Nevertheless
in its first werk of operation it managed to attract of 230^out of a
total of 1300 banned schoolchildren (50). In Alexandra the Haile Selaiss
School was opened after the boycott with 1000 pupils: it too had written
to the Bantu Education Department to register under the terms of the Act
In its case permission was refused, possibly because members of the
'Madzunya' ANC group (see below) were among the teachers. (51)
Muc h more detailed knowledge of the events and conditions at a local
level is needed before any firm conclusions can be made. Were the
parents who were behind the formation of community schools people who
originally supported the boycott and then grown disenchanted? Or were
their children prevented from registering against their parents1 wills? In
Alexandra Congress organisers alleged that tsotsis intimidated children
who were on their way to school (52). In the Western townships ANC picket
were mainly young women who reportedly threatened to 'wallop1 children if
they stayed at school (53). In this context it is perhaps significant tha"
the boycott in the Western Areas affected only primary schools. However
The World reported on 12 March 1955 that parents meetings opposed the
establishment of school committees (under the terms of the act) in
Roodepoort, Moroka, Jabavu and Sophiatown. Parents apparently took an acti"
part in the boycotts at Natalspruit (54). The fact that the movement
started at branch level and was only later taken up by the provincial and
national organisation does suggest that there was initially strong local
support. But this may have been due as much to the influence of branch
members^ who were teachers as to the feelings of the local community.
Twenty-Jone teachers in Alexandra were involved (there were twelve schools
altogether employing about 150 teachers), ten teachers were dismissed in
Benoni as a result of their support for the boycott and in Brakpan
nineteen out of a possible forty-four teachers were involved (55). In the
Western Native Township teachers-.were- said to be sending home children
who arrived at school (56). Teachers probably had a high degree of
influence at branch level* the provincial executive for. 1955 may not have
included any teachers and this may account for the way it lagged behind
branch nilitancy (57). Delegates to the Transvaal provincial conference
in Orlando in October 1955 complained that the executive was failing to
provide leadership, and that the executive report did not include any
discussion of the education boycott. The reluctence of provincial ANC
leaders to fully endorse the boycott and the ANC»s failure to develop the
campaign on a national level help to explain the serious decline in
Transva|al branch membership that was,reported at the conference. (58)
But there is evidence which suggests that ANC action at a branch level
was an sxpressionfwidespread communal anxieties rather than a manifestatic
of the ^lienation of an educated minority in the branch membership. In the
year that followed the boycott ANC members were elected to and were able
to control the advisory boards of three of the^locations most heavily
affected by the education boycott: Roodeport, Natalspruit and Benoni.(59)
In Brakpan, where all the school* were affected and which had the greatest
proportion of teachers dismissed in March 1956.there was a boycott of
buses, in protest against a Id; raise in fares! the boycott was organised
by the ANC and the local vigilance committee. The secretary of the vigilan-
committee was also a branch office holder of the ANC. It is also interest,
that the boycott»which commanded majority support in the location,wa^s
opposed by the Brakpan Civil Protection Society, the group which had
established the community school in opposition to the ANC boycott.(60)
The school was established with the support of the local council which
provided accomodation. it charged fees;which possibly only a certain
group of parents would have been able to afford. It could be argued that
Bantu education represented a denial of opportunity for those families
who had no other resources to provide a basis of social mobility for their
children: in this context the fact that the boycott began in one of the
poorest locations, Benoni, might be significant.
The Alexandra bus boycott, which lasted from January 7th to April 3rd 1957
illustrates t-ie complexity of local atrnuiH t y-b 3 sed political action. The
8s i r £ t
restored to the old level,
locations were also affected by™h° fart in?rease^6I?.
fares wei
meeting was called by the Vigilance Association among
who attended were several d i s t inc t groups. They Include
dholders and Tenants Association, the local branch of t
. —. nya) group, the ANC National-Minded bloc, the Movement
Democracy of Content and the Workers League (62). The committee tha t
was-formed va-s thus a coal i t ion of different p o l i t i c a l and economic^
in t e r e s t s . The Vigilance Association and the Standholders and Tenants
Association reprented about 1000 standholders and people who rebted stands
from external property owners (63). A " I*BHK~- —* -1-1--
S Mahlangu was.i elected as APTC chairma
Vigilance Committee member, R D Sishi .
committee were Alfred Nzo, '
members of the ANC Worn ens,1 ^ca
hold e r s , they represented the x
a healph inspector and T Nkobi a xao> , _, _
group was led by a former ANC hranch cnairman, Jbsias Madzunya, who
opposed the formation of the multi-racial Congress Alliance and the ANC's
adoption of the Freedom Charter. They were a less educated or a r t i c u l a t e
para l le l group to the 'Afi*icanist *'• Youth league faction in Orlando.
Mad zunva had been expelled from the ANC* *« i~*-~
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i t s Alexandra supporters wa^RG S ? ^ 1 " v,Very l i t t l e 'allowing. Amongst
c ompany(67). ,It may be sSnlflSaS ?hlt' t OWn^ a? S s t a t e agency a n d • b
there was a campa ign by A l e x a n d r r A ^ v m o n t h s b e f o r e t t l e b °yc° t t
from the locat ion (68) . I n genera! the AN? ^ s } n e s ? l n ^ to oust Indian trade
conservative group; i t was tradi?in™Ni National Minded Bloc was a
and i t s leadership'was composed of ^ o ^ h 0 ^ 0 3 ? 5 1 t o " o y ^ t t s of a l l kinds
other groups are not wel? d S e n t e d ? i & ^ S i n e S S m e n a n d t r a d e r s - The
Democracy of Content was a l a r S t u d P ^ f? M°k o2y a n e of the Movement for
Witwatersrand and claimed to h V S i ? 2 \ ? e U n i v ers i ty of the
Mokonyane was ejected secretary S ^ S ^ m 1 1 1 ^ U n l ° n S ( 6 9 ) * D a n
secretary ot the Peoples' Transport Committee.
But it would be misleading to view the boycott as the result of
the organisation represented by the coalition--of-interests on the Peoples1
Transport Committee. One African commentator wrote:
Nobody really organised the Alexandra bus boycott. People started
talking among themselves about the intolerable conditions .. They
said among themselves that the moment of reckoning would come one
day, but nobody took their murm Tings seriously. One morning
however, a few people refused to oay the higher fares1... and
within a few £ys the boycott had snowballed into a movement of
incredible dimensions... (70)
Matshikazi Themba wrote in Drum
He wanted the 4d back as.an immedlete step, and he wanted a review
of wages to follow ...murm ring of a new slogan to succeed Azikwelwa
(we will not ride) 'Gein1 Ukudla' (keep food for a rainy day). The
existing political parties have had to break into a run to feeep up
with him. The man of the street is ahead of his own committee... (71)
It should be remembered that Alexandra was exceptional among Johannesburg
locations in that it fell outside the administration of the municipal
c ouncil and was administered by theAlexandraHealph Board, a body with
very limited powers. It could do little to prevent overcrowding: standhold
-ers were allowed to build up to fifteen rooms a stand: each stand could
accomodate up to 180 people. Rooms were let a a rent of between £3 and
£4 a month.{72). An infant mortality rate of 400 per thousand was
claimed by a local doctor(73) and average wages were said to be . .
£2 IOs a week ] A notorious crime rate was partly due to trie fact that it
was comparatively difficult for Alexandra residents to find jobs in the
Johannesburg municipal areas which resulted in widespread unemployment (75")
During the boycott decisions were taken at well attended open air meetings
whe re thousands of people voted, not by small committees. Speeches at the
meetings reflected the general desperation:
When we are tired we shall rest.. They are punishing us because we
are poor •• save food and prepare for the offensive. (7b)
But the detailed breakdown of the composition of the APTC is helpful becaus
during the following three months divisions within the co'^ittee emerged,
these were prompted by initiatives taken by the Johannesburg employers
and PUTCO itself. At first within the employers there were also
differences. The Chamber of Commerce appealed to firms to actively
discourage boycotters whereas industrialists arranged for lorries to
collect their employees from Alexandra(77). However by the beginning of Feb-
ruary the Chamber of Commerce was urging that employers should pay an
extra shilling a week transport allowance: an offer that most of their
members endorsed but which was rejected by the boycott coramittee(7£).
Cra cks in the unity of the boycott committee began to appear when PUTCO
threatened on the I6th of February to withdraw all bus services permenantly
if the boycott was not called off by March 1st. Though a meeting held in
Alexandra on the evening of the 20th voted for the boycott to go on the
PUTCO threat succeeded in alarming some members of the boycott committee.
On Sunday 35th there was a secret meeting between six of the original
leaders headedby S Mahlangu and PUTCO representatives. This group was to
urge other organisers not to make any drastic decision but it was advice thf
went unheeded: a meeting of 5000 thousand voted to continue the boycott (^ -
The World provides an indication to the identity of this more conciliertary
group when it reported half way through March that two property owners'
organisations and a political party was involved in seeking a solution (Xc>)«
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Negotiations began again on March I8th with the city council. This time
II
a system was devised in which people would buy a 5d ticket for 4d with
a subsidy going direct to the bus compnay. In addition PUTCO and the
council would try and persuade the goverment to permenently subsidise the
fares at a pre-boycott level out of the Native Services Levy. These
negotiations caused a second division among the boycott organisers: the
ANC was to support the scheme and an ANC pamphlet of April 1st urged peopl
to use the PUTCO buses whicn began running again on that day. However
Mokonyane and the Madzunya group opposed the new offer. This time they
were unsuccessful: onlyone out of three meetings held on Sunday March 31st
voted to continue the boycott(89). At a meeting on April.'9th Mokonyane
gave two reasons forcontinuing the boycotts no parallel arrangement had
been made to lower fares at Lady Selbourne and no formal agreement had
been signed with the Chamber of Commerce (90). However the pro-boycott
faction were fighting a losing battle: by April 5th 48 000 people rode
on the buses from Alexandra (91).
There are several possible reasons for the shift in the ANC position. Firsi
it is possible that March saw a decline in the enthusiasm of the boycotter:
The offer they finally accepted was not so verydifferent from the
original Chamber of Commerce proposal at the end of February - it was
a temporary arrangement as the government agreement to subsidize PUTCO
(.- lid not come until June, long after the boycott was over. After the
buses were withdrawn on ist March one of the objective tests of the
boycotters willingness to walk no longer existed for they had no
alternative. The meetings, which rejected the offer were held at six o cloc
in the evening: a time when many people would still have been on their way
home. Secondly, during the month there was a discernable shift in white
sympathy: newspapers reported a falling-off in the numbers of lifts
offered to boycotters. At the same time it may be relevant that the ANC
was more closely in touch with white liberal opinion than the other groups
and therefore may have been more sensitive to this shift. Bishop Ree ves
who was-known to sympathise with the ANC had been closely associated with
the negotiations that led up to the Chamber of Commerce offer. Thirdly
the ANC, ajs-;we have seen,was not as concerned as-other groups to stress the
purely ecdnomic aspects of the boycott. During the boycott they pursued'an
active recruitment policy; ANC membership in Alexandra went up by six
times (92). For the local ANC organisers the boycott was a considerable
political.success; for during it they were able to. eclipse their political
rivals. It is also possible that the local ANC branch was under pressure
from the national leadership to accept a settlement though there is no
evidence for this (93). The decision to end the boycott certainly
alienated Lady Selbourne. They were to be bitfcer about the lack of support
after April from other twonships and they were left out of arrangment
to subsidize fares from the Native Services Levy. Their unsuceesful boycott
lasted for several more months and the Alexandra dissidents vainly urged..
a sympathy boycott (94). *
Why did the boycott recieve such overwhelming and sustained support? Both
PUTCO and the police admitted that there was no evidence that the
boycotters were being intimidated into not using the buses.(95) The
boycott lasted in the Western Areas without the aid of mass meetings;
were banned by the city council (96). First, the fare rise did
represent a significant burden on a mont ly family income of less? than
£15 and *»s has been mentioned social conditions in Alexandra were especially
desperate. Then a succesful boycott had recently been fought in Evaton; th:
could have provided some encouragement as might have the menory of the
war-time boycotts in Alexandra itself. The initial unity of interests
represented by the APTC was Important: the boycott was energetically led
with numerous mass meetings where the main decisions were taken. The
original motives of the Standholders remain unclear. It is tempting to
speculate that they may have hoped to profit from the boycott by
organising alternative transport. But in fac^ there was no such move.
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Instead there was a suggestion that an approach shoild be made to
African bus-operators in Durban to start a service in.Alexandra.(97)
An important factor in the sustaining of the boycott was the response of
employers. Industrialists were reported to be frightened of losing
experienced workers: this may have been one reason why they initially
2 P£™ a cooperative approach. The willingness of commerce, industry
and PUTCG to negotiate must have contributed to the boycotters'
consciousness of their position. Finally the ANC's contribution was
important: by organising sympathy boycotts (which for a period were also
staged in Port Elizabeth and East London) they decreased the risk of
boycotters feeling isolated and increased the pressure on ithe municipal
authorities. *
The ANC was most effective when it succeeded in identifying itself
with the anxieties and concerns that arose from poverty. It's ability to
do this very much depended on the sort of people who dominated it at
branch level. In Sophiatown where its prominent office holders tended to
be property owners it tried to reconcile the interests of the poor with
their local exploiters. There was also a sharp conflict between generations
a hostility which was expressed which was expressed by Vundla during the
(. .education campaign:
I am getting tired of you young fellows always talking about
the 'people1... I am not going to let you do as you please in
our meeting and you will not dictate to your parents what to do.
You are going too far and you do not want to be controlled. The
mess that is in Congress today is because of you oeople.(9S)
The education campaign was qualitively different from the opposition
to the removals. A strong case can be made for arguing that the ANC
* evoked support from a much wider section of the community in the areas
where the schools were boycotted and the correlation between those
who supported the anti-boycott school in Brakpan and the people who
were against the bus boycott the following year is interesting.
In Alexandra the ANC was led by people who were not property owners
and they were therefora able to align themselves with popular disatisfactic
and to correctly estimate the limits of protest. So it is therefore
difficult to generalise about the ANC at a branch level. What can be
seen is that the involvement of ANC branches in communal politics was
.. helping to create a gulf between them and a more wary provincial
v
--leadership. This came out at a special provincial congress in April
1956 that was convened to discuss passes for women. It was decided that
instead of a general campaign each branch should initiate action according
to local circumstances. Many branch delegates were critical of the
leadership for failing to take a lead on the issue. Among the most vocal
critics was Joe Molefi, a leader of the Evaton bus boycott. The.:Evaton
boycott was to recieve no outside assistance from Congress and significant:
the two ANC leaders involved, Molefi and Vus Make, were later to join the
Pan Africanists.
The events in Alexandra suggest that there was a much wider and more
general participation in protest and resistance than the opposition
generated and led by the ANC would indicate. The ANC was only one of the
groups involved and not the most radical. The boycott suddenly made :
:. the frustration and the anger of the local community visible. '
Bus boycotts were a fairly cora-on a::d noticeable form of protest on the
? in the mid 1950s: as suggested early in this paper the feelings of
social despair that were behind them could also be channelled into other
less well documented types of resistance. Until these are recorded our
understanding of African opposition will be distorted.
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